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O n tHe C over of t Ue RoIUnq Stone: 
TowarcI a ThEORy of C uIturaL ThERApy
K aLi TaL
On the cover of the 7 April 1988 Rolling Stone there is a picture 
of Martin Luther King. He's looking toward the future and his head fills 
the page, even covering a portion of the Rolling Stone logo — and the 
issue carries the headline ‘Portrait of a Generation.' ‘An 
unprecedented poll of young Americans: What they think about their 
lives, their county and their leaders.'  ’ Rolling Stone paints a picture of 
a generation whose idealism springs from the example of the civil rights 
movement, and whose disillusion is bom partly of the assassinations of 
its cherished heroes — Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy — but 
"more profoundly the bitter disillusionment resuiting from the war in 
Vietnam'2. According to the Rolling Stone survey, the lessons this 
generation learned from Vietnam were "totally negative'3. The result 
of the Vietnam experience is that a generation consumed by the idea 
that it could rebuild the nation in its own idealistic image has given up 
this dream and retreated back into itself. No longer Interested in the big 
issues, most members of the generation prefer to Involve themselves In 
local causes like anti-drunk driving campaigns and neighborhood 
crime watches.
According to Rolling Stone, the members of this generation 
have also turned against the idea of enlisting in the military and fighting 
for their country.
Asked to select situations under which they would enlist, 27 
percent of the men surveyed could not Identify any situation 
that would lead them to enlist; 22 percent said they would 
enlist if America's strategic Interests were threatened; 19 
percent said they would enlist to keep a third-world nation 
from falling to communists; 33 percent would enlist if our close 
European allies were attacked; and 73 percent would enlist 
If war broke out on the North American continent4.
Rolling Stone concludes that foreign-policy planners are just going to 
have to live with this ‘ stunning political fact'. They argue that there is
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no longer a patriotic consensus supporting the cold war, and that 
skepticism has replaced belief in the necessity of foreign entanglements. 
Only 16 percent of the members of the generation think that the U.S. 
should have fought the Vietnam War. 55 percent favor staying out of 
other conflicts which might resemble Vietnam5. Top on this generation's 
list of foreign policy objectives is slowing down the arms race, chosen 
by 47 percent.
All of this might be heartening if the rest of the study didn't 
present so many troubling contradictions. For example, when asked 
why the U.S. had not won the Vietnam War the largest percentage of 
respondents (36 percent) said that they "felt the United States failed to 
make a great enough military effort.'  And the second most important 
foreign policy goal (next in line after arms reduction) is stopping 
terrorism. "41 percent said they would mildly or strongly favor a 
president who was committed to developing Star Wars.'6
Rolling Stone comments on the “split vision' of the generation, 
remarking that
This generation favors the Idea of redistributing Income to 
produce more equality, but It Is opposed to tax Increases.... It 
wants the government to stop terrorism and maintain a strong 
defense, but it also wants the country to end global hunger 
and stay out of foreign conflicts. ... The future leader who 
captures the Imagination of this generation will be the 
candidate who breaks free of his or her party's standard 
rhetoric and unashamedly embraces these contradictory 
yearnings7.
The last sentence in that paragraph is particularly striking. 
Standard rhetoric will no longer do. Contradictory yearnings should be 
uncritically embraced. A rational stance is no longer necessary, even 
as a pretense, asserts Rolling Stone. How have we come to this place?
An indication of where to look for an answer is provided by a 
recent study on the Civil War by historian Eric Linderman8. I originally 
approached Linderman'sstudy, Embattled Courage, with the intention 
of comparing the contemporary process of developing a new improved 
image of the Vietnam combat soldier to the similar process of revision 
described by Underman. Linderman argues that the Civil War resulted 
in the destruction of cherished soldierly ideals in both soldiers and 
civilians on both sides. Soldiers, whose notions of honor and glory had 
undergone radical change when they were subjected to the rigors of 
the battlefield, resented their treatment by the civilians who had sent 
them off to war. And civilians, heartilysick of war, wanted nothing more 
to do with soldiers. This situation lasted some fifteen years until around 
1880 when Americans once again became interested in hearing
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about the Civil War. Linderman argues that
As the Civil War was Incorporated in public ritual and the 
reputation of soldiering rose, participation In war became an 
Important mark of merit. Honor attached itself less to 
courageous or cowardly conduct, battles won or lost, causes 
preserved or destroyed than to one's simple presence in the 
w ar.... As community ritual magnified the war, the war began 
to magnify all those who had fought and lived9.
This reassessment (which came some fifteen years after the 
Civil War) seems mirrored in the revisionist histories of the Vietnam War 
which began appearing in the early 1980s. The current reinterpretations 
seem particularly ominous in light of Linderman's observation that: 
"The values young men carried to war in 1898 were again those of 
1861.... But the picture of war that sons carried to Cuba was false 
because their fathers' memories had become false to the war of 1864­
6 5 .'10
With this argument in mind, I began to document and describe 
the phenomenon of the appearance of the Vietnam War in public 
ritual and popular culture, and correlate that process with our growing 
military presence in Central America. The argument seemed particularly 
compelling in light of the recent headlines describing U.S. troop 
movement in Honduras, and the first hints that we might consider using 
military means to secure our access to the Panama Canal.
But the 7 April issue of Rolling Stone forced me to reevaluate 
both my argument and my methodology. Pop culture rag that it is. 
Rolling Stone had a point: as a generation, we docontradict ourselves. 
Somehow, those contradictions must be dealt with. I don't buy the 
Rolling Stone ideal of synthesis — the idea that one candidate, or party 
or platform might really be able to reconcile all of those conflicting 
desires. Many of those desires are mutually exclusive, and anyone who 
looks at it rationally ought to be able to see that. But I do think they are 
correct in identifying what it is that we want. And this raises new 
questions: What is the process which causes clearly drawn ideological 
lines to blur and fade over time? What are these clear ideologies 
replaced by? How do new ideologies come into being?
The first possibility that comes to mind, of course, is a comparison 
with Kuhn's” description of scientific paradigms — old paradigms do 
not fall apart gradually, but are replaced only when a complete new 
paradigm emerges and when the powerful proponents of the old 
paradigm have died off. Kuhn's explanation, however, is not sufficient 
for understanding the gradual process of paradigmatic metamorphosis 
which seems to be occurring as this generation shifts piece-meal from 
one ideological stance to another.
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Another problem with Kuhn isthat ideologies cannot be equated 
with scientific paradigms; the purpose of an ideology is not to explain 
a given set of phenomena, but to provide a social, cultural and 
political framework with which a human being can assimilate and 
interpret events. Ideologies 'renderotherwise incomprehensible social 
situations meaningful,' they ’construe them as to make it possible to 
act purposefully within them '12. Exchanging one ideology for another 
is almost always the result of some discomfort, some problem, with the 
original ideology.
The decision to shift from one ideology to another is not made 
at the level of group decision, however. Psychologist Daniel Goleman 
provides us with a description of one of the important factors shaping 
ideological shift in his book Vital Lies. Simple Truths: A Psychology of Self­
Deception. Goleman attempts to tackle the difficult question of how 
people choose their particular versions of reality in order to cope with 
the anxieties of their day-to-day lives13. ’Technically speaking,' he 
says, "cop ing ' is the term for a range of cognitive maneuvers that 
relieve stress arousal by changing one's own reaction rather than 
altering the stressful situation itse lf.'14 He adds: ’ If the locus for anxiety 
in the world is immovable, then that leaves room for change only in 
how one perceives the w orld .'15 Certain areas of thought, or events, 
are blocked out or revised — seen in ’shadow'.
Though coping mechanisms occur on an individual level, they 
have a cumulative social effect:
The collective mind Is as vulnerable to self-deceit as 
the Individual mind. The particular zones of shadow for a 
given collective are the product of a simple calculus of the 
schemas shared by Its members. The areas of experience 
blanked out In the most Individual minds will be the darkest 
zone for the group as a whole.
Cultures and nations offer the best examples of this 
principle writ large. ... An index of a culture's uniqueness, 1 
suggest. Is Its blind spots, the particular elements of reality the 
cultural 'we' represses to ease anxieties16.
If this is an accurate assessment, the examination of the popular 
culture generated by a nation or a people takes on entirely new 
meaning and significance. The nature of this shift might best be 
explained by a use of the methaphor of the patient-therapist 
relationship. The duty of the therapist is to be an objective listener, an 
outsider, a mirror to the patient who is revealed to him or herself 
gradually during the course of successful therapy. The therapist listens 
carefully to what the patient says, and takes even more careful note 
of what the patient does not say. As a patient's coping methods are
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gradually made conscious, the patient then has the opportunity to 
discard mechanisms which were once successful but which may now 
be self-destructive or damaging.
Popular culture reflects the unconscious decision of a society to 
represent or repress particular events and conditions. A culture's 
representations may provide the best map forthose who are interested 
in studying its blind spots. Susan Kappeler, a feminist theorist who writes 
chiefly about the implications of pornographic representation, has 
thought deeply about the significance of representations as cultural 
objects. In Pornography and Representation, she explains that:
Representations are not Just a matter of certain objects — 
books. Images, films, etc. The structure of representation 
extends to ‘perceptions' and self-images, the anxious pose of 
the bourgeois community In front of the camera of public 
opinion.... Representation Is thus one of the most fundamental 
structures of conceptualization, centered on the subject. Just 
as fiction Is not Just a matter of stories In books, but of narrative 
conceptualization In general ... perception Is the 
representation of something to oneself, a conflation of the 
author and the audience In one single subject. Perception 
externalized Inserts Itself Into the structure of communication 
between different subjects: author and audience may be 
separate Individuals. It will therefore be expedient to look at 
representation in the context of communication17.
Popular culture mediums do not simply reflect the ideas and 
opinions of the mass culture, but are part of an ongoing dialogue 
between members of that culture, shaping and being shaped by their 
individual anxieties and fears.
This process is described quite well by Jean Elshtain, who
asserts:
Narratlvesof warand polltlcsare Inseparable from theactMties 
of war and politics; each — writing about and doing war and 
politics — are practices existing In a complex, mutually 
constitutive relationship. I espouse no vulgar notion of mimesis 
here. Rather, stories of war and politics structure Individual 
and collective experiences In ways that set the horizon for 
human expectations In later epochs.... The politics of the text 
distorts by expressing exaggerated fears and hopes — 
amplifications that go on to become embedded In practices18.
And this brings me back to the Rolling Stone survey. If we take 
their challenge seriously and try to create a coherent ideology out of 
the generation's “contradictory yearnings' we are certainly doomed
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to failure. The challenge is, itself, a part of the problem — a gesture of 
faith in illusion, a declaration of the need for a new coping mechanism. 
We must, instead, question the ideological framework that supports 
such a challenge.
The metaphor of the therapist seems, once again, peculiarly 
suitable. A therapist notes his patient's delusions, but does not 
participate in them, will not be drawn into the conversation on the 
patient's terms. The mental health care worker who operates on the 
level of societies rather than individuals might properly be called a 
“cultural therapist." And it is as a cultural therapist that I will approach 
the problems posed by Rolling Stone.
The cultural therapist, examining the survey results gathered 
from questions about the Vietnam War, would formulate certain 
important questions: 1) What are the bases on which this generation 
has decided that the U.S. should not have been involved in the 
Vietnam War? 2) What fears oranxieties are reflected in this generation's 
reluctance to involve itself in foreign wars which it perceives to be 
similar to the war in Vietnam? and, 3) In what terms are these issues 
addressed?
The third question is the most crucial, and it is certainly the one 
which would benefit most from the examination of a cultural therapist. 
The terms of a discussion limit and define appropriate topics and 
arguments. For example, the Rolling Stone survey asked which one of 
four factors best explained why the U.S. lost the war in Vietnam:
36 percent said they felt the United States failed to make a 
great enough military effort. Twenty percent cited the a ntl war 
protests and the lack of support In the United States for the 
war. Another 20 percent felt It was because of the lack of 
adequate military and civilian support from our South 
Vietnamese allies, and 8 percent said It was because of the 
strength and numbers of the opposing communist forces'9.
What is the framework for the discussion here? Distinctly missing 
are any factors which might be part of a moral or ethical discussion of 
American involvement, or which might offer some kind of historical 
perspective. The designers of the survey cannot be held entirely 
responsible for their omission, which is reflected in the culture as a 
whole and has been noted by other Vietnam War scholars. The 
tendency to limit discussion of the Vietnam War by confining the arena 
of discussion has been recognized by both traditional and popular 
culture historians. The following two quotes illustrate this observation. 
Historian William Gibson notes:
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(In the 1980s) The w a r... disappeared as a topic for study and 
political consideration and Instead became dispersed and 
Institutionalized in the complex of medical, psychiatric, and 
legal discourse. Itwasaslfanewserlesof medical and Judicial 
problems with no traceable origin had appeared In American 
society. Orrather.although It wasack no wledged that Vietnam 
was the origin, once the word 'Vietnam' was mentioned, the 
war itself was dismissed and discussion moved on to how an 
Institution could solve the problem20.
In popular culture discourse, as well, the terms of the discussion 
have been limited in the ways that Michael Clark describes:
The motive underlying Rambo: First Blood. Part 2  and all the 
other back-to-Nam films Is ... a desperate wish to restore the 
community broken apart by that w a r... these films possess an 
undercurrent of bitterness and Indignation at the betrayal of 
Innocence that reflects the more profound and utopian 
longing behind the poignant conclusion of The Deerhunter. 
the sappy optimism of The Lady from Yesterday, and the 
sentimental rea liza tion of personal correspondence 
embodied In the most recent memorials. The utopian impulse 
behind all of these works has come to dominate popular 
representatlonsof the memory ofVletnam despite the lingering 
political animosities stemming from that war. and the only 
uncertainty that remains now seems to be whether that 
Impulse will find expression In the xenophobic vengeance of 
a chromed steel jungle knife, or the sentimental family Ideal 
of a letter home2’.
Both of these observations shed some light on the fears and 
anxieties reflected in the answers to questions about Vietnam in the 
Rolling Stone survey. By leaving out moral and historical questions and 
focusing on the psychic damage the war has caused Americans, we, 
as a society, can successfully avoid dealing with the difficult issue of 
responsibility and leave our collective self-image intact. The extent to 
which we are able to delude ourselves is stunning. In an August 1987 
New York Times article about the city of Hu6, journalist Barbara 
Crossette penned a line which promised absolution to any remaining 
Americans who had moral qualms about the war: ’Sometimes,' she 
wrote, "the Vietnamese seemed to be blaming Americans less for 
what happened here than Americans blame themselves.'22
On a societal as well as an individual psychological level, the 
penalty for repression is repetition. In Goleman's word's: "On the one 
hand, we forget we have done this before and, on the other, do not 
quite realize what we are doing again. The self-deception is complete. ' a
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These words from J. Glenn Gray's classic World War 2 narrative. 
The Warriors seem to most clearly represent the dangers of that process 
of self-deception:
I am afraid to fo rget.... What protrudes and does not fit in our 
pasts rises to haunt us and makes us spiritually unwell In the 
present.... We may become refugees In an Inner sense unless 
we remember to some purpose. Surely the menace of new 
and more frightful wars Is not entirely unrelated to our failure 
to understand those recently fought. If we could gain only a 
modicum of greater wisdom concerning what manner of 
men we are, what effect might it not have on future events?24
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